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The Freedom of Religion or Belief in the ECHR since Kokkinakis 
Or 
‘Quoting Kokkinakis’ 
 
Professor Sir Malcolm Evans 
 
Introduction 
There are times when one wonders whether the European Court of Human Rights secretly 
subscribes to some doctrine of infallibility. There are relatively few examples of its simply 
accepting that it has got something wrong – although this does happen from time to time.1 
When it does want to move on from a position previously held, it usually does so by pointing 
to changes in thinking or of approach which have occurred within the countries of the 
Council of Europe as a justification for its doing so.2 This is understandable; but even then, it 
tends to perpetuate an aura of infallibility by continually referring to what it first said on a 
question as providing the basis for its reasoning and approach -  as being a conceptual 
template against which all else is to be explained and developed, for ever and ever (Amen). 
Thus in several critical areas of its jurisprudence, it is as if time stands still, that that its first 
thoughts were its best thoughts, and that the current and the future must be approached and 
understood through that lens. 
This tendency is, of course, facilitated by the relatively vacuous nature of many of these 
statements of grounding principle. In the context of Article 9 the oft-quoted passage from the 
Kokkinakis case3 setting out the essence of the Courts’ approach says that:  
‘freedom of thought, consciences and religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic 
society’ within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the 
most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of 
life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The 
pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the 
centuries, depends on it’. 
Who can disagree with such noble sentiments, stressing as they do the significance of 
thought, conscience and religion to those holding such beliefs and to democratic society and 
democratic pluralism more generally? Well, some would. Religious pluralism is increasingly 
                                                          
1 In the context of the freedom of religion or belief a clear example is the decision by the European 
Commission on Human Rights in X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden (dec.), no. 7805/77, Commission 
decision of 5 May 1979, DR 16, p. 68 at 70 in which it reversed its previous decisions that legal entities could 
not have rights under Article 9 and that the rights of churches were adequately protected by the rights given 
to their members. 
2 Well-known examples include the suggestion, in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK, no 61498/02, ECHR 2010, 
para 120, that Article 2 has been amended by state practice so that the death penalty amounts to a violation 
of the Convention, and - in the context of the subject matter of this chapter - that Article 9 of the ECHR 
sustains a claim to conscientious objection from military service in Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, 
ECHR 2011. 
3 Kokkinakis v. Greece, Judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A, No, 260-A, para 31. 
seen in some quarters as being as much a threat to democratic society as it is a bulwark of it – 
and it is by no means obvious that democracy is necessarily a friend of religious pluralism, as 
recent events in some parts of Europe have made all too obvious. But even for those who 
endorse such noble sentiments, is there any problem with referring to Kokkinakis in this 
mantra-like fashion? If it does not mean very much, then surely it cannot really do any harm?  
Unfortunately, it can – and it does. There are at least three reasons for this. The first is that 
focussing on Kokkinakis as the foundational case on the freedom of religion or belief draws a 
veil over both the actual origins of the jurisprudence on which the current approach to Article 
9 of the ECHR is based, as well as over the extent to which this has changed over time.  
Secondly, it tends to magnify the importance of some legal claims by endowing them with 
some fundamental significance which, quite frankly, they do not necessarily have. Thirdly, 
and somewhat in contradistinction to the previous point, it tends to perpetuate the idea that 
the freedom of religion of belief is less of an individual right and more of a general societal 
question, because there is so much at stake. By masking its basic assumptions and its 
subsequent development, allowing the trivial to be elevated and the significant to be 
marginalised, ‘quoting Kokkinakis’ does little to assist the enjoyment of the freedom of 
religion or belief in Europe today. It has become a veil behind which almost anything can be 
justified, whilst seemingly maintaining a façade of continuity and consistency of approach. 
When it is cited, it tends have the same effect as a ‘refresh’ button – allowing thinking to start 
from scratch and permitting Article 9 to be develop in quite unexpected – and often quite 
contradictory – ways. In what follows the first of these three consequences will be explored 
in more detail.4  
The legal dimensions of Article 9  
As Carolyn Evans points out,5 the basic building blocks of Article 9 are not really explored in 
Kokkinakis. The Court inherited its approach from the work of the Commission in a series of 
decisions – many of them inadmissibility decisions – given over a twenty year period prior to 
its judgment.6 Conceptually speaking, the ‘freedom of religion or belief’ before Kokkinakis is 
in some ways very much more interesting than afterwards. It was in these decisions that the 
fundamentals were determined: that there was to be a bright-line distinction between the 
‘forum internum’ and the ‘forum externum’;7 that the concept of religion or belief was to be 
broad and inclusive;8 that the manifestation of ‘religion or belief’ meant that the 
                                                          
4 The second and third consequences will be explored in a longer article which is to follow. 
5 See C Evans, ‘Pre-Kokkinakis Case-law of the ECHR: Foreshadowing the Future’, in this Special Edition.  
6 Inevitably, it is the older editions of leading textbooks and the earliest specialist works which give most 
attention to the contribution of the Commission to the formation of the approach to Article 9, simply as there 
was little else to focus on. Examples include M Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997) and C Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001). The early Commission decisions developed the conceptual 
foundations which have remained relatively unchallenged and still provide the basic frame of reference for an 
Article the meaning of which is eminently contestable. This is why these early analyses remain so widely 
quoted: they remain highly relevant. 
7 This appears to have first been set out by the Commission in C. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 10358/83, 
Commission decision of 15 December 1983, and is repeated in little more than half a dozen subsequent 
Commission decisions and about the same number of Court judgments. I am grateful to Caroline Roberts for 
this statistical information. 
8 E.g. Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, no. 7050/75, Commission Report, 12 October 1978, DR 19 (pacificm). 
By way of relatively early examples (of which there are many) see, e.g. Knudsen v. Norway (dec.), no. 
manifestation of any pattern of thought or conscience, religious or otherwise (provided that it 
was sufficiently cogent and serious) was to be protected; 9 that manifestations did not include 
all actions motivated by ones religion or belief;10 that the protections of the rights and 
freedoms of others was to be understood in a broad fashion, not linked to a particular right or 
freedom or another identifiable individual, but to the general interests of society as a whole.11 
In Kokkinakis the Court set out or applied these approaches but did not really reflect on them.  
This is not to criticise, but to observe. However, by accepting the thrust of the Commission’s 
work over the years, the Court endorsed an approach which allowed a very broad range of 
claims to be made in term of Article 9, but which at the same time allowed for a very 
restrictive approach to their enjoyment in practice. This is perhaps the logic of a 
jurisprudence largely grounded on inadmissibility decisions: the focus tends to be on why 
there is no violation, rather than on the contours of the right. It ought to be remembered that 
even in Kokkinakis, the violation of Article 9 was more procedural than substantive – a 
failure to give adequate reasons for the conviction for proselytising, rather than on the act 
itself.  
These have all become ‘received wisdoms’ which have become embedded in the work of the 
Court, and reflected in much of its output. But the Court has not stood still. Indeed, most of 
the fundamental issues highlighted above have been subject to re-appraisal or re-
interpretation. It has also developed new strands of thinking concerning Article 9. The 
problem is that, due to the constant repetition of the Kokkinkis mantra, these developments 
tend either to get overlooked, or not incorporated into a consistent and authoratative line of 
reasoning. As a result, they can be ‘picked up’ or ‘put down’ more or less at will. The 
following sections will illustrate this by looking briefly at how some of these key questions 
have been engaged with other, new, approaches developed against the background of 
Kokkinakis. 
(i) the forum internum and the forum externum 
Few elements of the Article 9 framework seem more settled than the distinction between the 
right to hold a pattern of thought conscience or religion - the forum internum – which is 
subject to absolute protection, and the freedom to manifest that pattern of religion or belief - 
the forum externum – which is subject to limitation. Recent research in fact tends to show that 
the origins of this distinction are less clear and less substantial than have been assumed.12 It is 
certainly the case that the argument that the right of ‘have’ a religion or belief has no 
practical consequences in the ‘external realm’ has been called into question by decisions such 
                                                          
11045/84, Commission decision of 8 March 1985, DR 42, p. 258 (opposition to abortion)  W. v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.), no. 18187/91, Commission decision of 10 February 1993 (veganism). 
9 Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, 25 February 1982, Series A no. 48 para 36. 
10 Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, no. 7050/75, Commission Report, 12 October 1978, DR 19. 
11 Thus the commission rejected a number of applications from prisoners whose individual claims were 
rejected on the basis of the more generic need to maintain ‘prison order’. For a helpful summary see Jacobs, 
White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp 420-422. 
12 P Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with Particular 
Reference to the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and Human Rights 183, who explores the 
parallels between the uses of these terms by the Commission and within canon law. Harris O’Boyle and 
Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2014), 594 also note 
that the distinction not clearer defined, but observe that the caselaw tends towards giving the forum internum 
a limited meaning, and offering (as a result) little protection. 
as Alexandridis v Greece,13 and Sinan Isak v Turkey,14 in which the State was prevented from 
requiring a person to reveal their religious affiliation. Refusing to reveal ones religion is not 
aptly described as a manifestation of religion or belief: I am not aware of any religion which 
requires its followers to refuse to reveal their religious identity to others, but there are, of 
course, many situations in which religious believers might not wish to do so; some of which 
are more pressing that others. The only way such Court decisions can be explained 
convincingly is by seeing them as extending the scope of the forum internum, by accepting 
that the mere fact of holding a religion or belief must mean that there a range of necessary 
ancilliary protections which flow from this.  
These, then, are some examples where the Court has concluded that the state is  ‘putting 
upon’ a person in an improper fashion by requiring them to reveal their religious identity for 
some bureaucratic purpose. However, there are others, such as Wasmuth v. Germany, in 
which the Court thought that ‘putting upon’ a person in a similar fashion was, in fact, 
acceptable.15 Does this means that some violations of the forum internum can, in fact, be 
justifiable? What does seem clear is that the absolute protection of the forum internum 
appears to have some discretionary edges. And does this mean that there is more permeability 
between the internal and external spheres than was previously thought? The implications of 
blurring the boundaries between the two spheres are profound, but the Court has not yet 
explored this as a matter of principle16 and it seems unlikely that it will do so. In the 
meanwhile, the confusion concerning this core element of Article 9 continues.  
(ii) What beliefs are protected? 
Another question on which some development has taken place since the Kokkinakis case and 
which deserves more systemic reflection from the Court than it has received concerns the 
beliefs which are protected by Article 9. As has been seen, Kokkinakis reflects the broad and 
inclusive approach that was previously found in the Commission’s case law, subject to the 
caveat that in order to be protected a belief must ‘attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance’.17 The Grand Chamber has recently elevated the 
significance of this caveat (and sent a signal that it might be taking a somewhat more robust 
approach) when, in S.A.S. v. France it stressed that ‘only’ such views were protected under 
Article 9.18 However, since denying a belief the protection of Article 9 is tantamount to 
saying that it is not ‘cogent, serious, cohesive or important’, it is understandable that the 
                                                          
13 Alexandridis v. Greece, no. 19516/06, 21 February 2008. 
14 Sinan Işık v. Turkey, no. 21924/05, ECHR 2010. 
15 Wasmuth v. Germany, no. 12884/03, 17 February 2011. The recent case of Klein v Germany (6th April 2017) 
the Court also concluded that there had been no violation of Article 9 when a husband was required to pay 
church tax owed by his wife, as a result of their having opted to submit a joint tax return (and which he was 
entitled to seek to reclaim). The case presupposes the legitimacy of the applicant having to make known his 
religious, or non-religious, affiliation, but this does not appear to have been considered problematic. 
16 There, is, however, a very interesting reflection on this relationship in the Separate Opinion of Judge Pinot 
de Albuquerque in Krupko and Others v. Russia, no. 26587/07, 26 June 2014, where he argues that: ‘The word 
religion derives from the Latin term ‘religare, which means bind, to bring together, to unite each woman and 
man with the deity (forum internum) and all women and men with one another (forum externum). The latter is 
no less important that the former from the believer’s point of view. For the believer, where the latter is 
hindered the former is per se encroached upon’. 
17 Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, 25 February 1982, Series A no. 48 para 36. 
18 S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, July 2014, para 55. 
Court is reluctant to get drawn too far on these questions. Nevertheless, there is also a danger 
that by not doing so it encourages frivolous claims, or extends a mantle of legitimacy over 
views which are potentially problematic.  
Moreover, once it has passed that threshold, it is not for the state to have a view on the 
legitimacy of those views: it now routinely says that ‘the state’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality is incompatible with any power …. to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or 
the way in which those beliefs are expressed’.19 Or so it is said. 
If fact, some views are excluded from protection by virtue of Article 17 of the Convention 
itself,20 although the application of this Article by the Court has not been very consistent.21 
The Court, in Pretty v UK, has also accepted that ‘not all opinions or convictions are beliefs 
in the sense protected by Article 9(1) of the Convention’.22 The truth is that, despite what the 
Court says, its practice is less than even-handed. It may, for example, just refuse to engage 
with the question at all. In the Mouvement Raelian Suisse v Switzerland case, for example, 
both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber found it unnecessary to determine whether the 
applicant movement’s claim fell under within the scope of Article 9 since it had already 
dismissed the substance of the claim under Article 10.23 Importantly, the Swiss Courts at all 
levels had considered the freedom of religion or belief to be engaged. This is significant 
since, in a number of cases concerning the Church of Scientology, the Court has relied on the 
domestic courts having considered Scientology to be a religion or belief as being a sufficient 
reason for it to treat the application as falling within the scope of Article 9.24 There is no 
consistency here. 
It is not obvious why the Court takes different approaches in these cases, but it might have 
less difficulty if it were to quote its own jurisprudence correctly. In Eweida v. UK the Court 
claims to be drawing in its seminal decision in Hasan and Chaush when explaining that it has 
no scope to question the legitimacy of beliefs which fall within the scope of Article 9. In fact, 
the paragraph it quotes says no such thing. It actually says that ‘but for very exceptional 
cases, the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any 
discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to 
                                                          
19 E.g. Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, ECHR 
2013, para 81. 
20 Article 17 provides that ‘Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the convention’. It 
should be noted that this refers to activities: this seems to suggest that it does not legitimate state action 
aimed at changing the views of those who may hold views which re antithetical to convention values from 
holding them. 
21 A conclusion reached by Jacobs, White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (2014), 124, 
following a helpful discussion, highlighting its controversial inadmissibility decision in Norwood v. UK, no. 
23131/03, ECHR 2004-XI.  
22 Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, ECHR 2002-III, para 82. 
23Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland, no. 16354/06, 13 January 2011, para 61;  Mouvement raëlien suisse 
v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, ECHR 2012, para 80.   
24 Church of Scientology of Moscow v. Russia, no. 18147/02, 5 April 2007; Church of Scientology of St 
Petersburg and Others v. Russia, no. 47191/06, 2 October 2014. 
express such beliefs are legitimate.’25 In other words – the Court is entitled to take a view 
after all. It seems that the Court just does not want to admit it. 
This helps explain the contentious decision in Leela Forderkreis EV v. Germany. In this case 
the Court accepted that it was acceptable for Germany to run an information campaign which 
highlighted the dangers to young people of becoming associated with the Osho Movement, 
since this was ‘consistent with the Contracting Parties’ positive obligations under Article 1 of 
the Convention to secure the rights and freedoms of persons within their jurisdiction’.26 
Presumably, such information was also available to those who already were members of the 
movement – and so seems to run perilously close to seeking to persuade such members to 
change their religion or belief. There is no doubt that the information campaign was intended 
to discourage people from joining it.27 Whilst such information might be considered merely 
‘informational’, not ‘coersive’ – and it is of course well established that a state may not seek 
to coerce a person into changing their religion or belief28 - , the idea that the state cannot have 
views concerning various forms of belief, and act on them, is, then, simply not true. And if it 
is not true for the State, how is it possible for the Court to get away with hiding behind a 
façade of inclusivity and non-evaluation? But this is what the Kokkinakis mantra tends to 
encourage and facilitate.   
(iii) the nature of manifestations 
A third core ‘architectural’ element of the Article 9 framework concerns manifestations, 
which according to the text take the form of ‘worship, teaching, practice and observance’. 
This is again an area which there has been considerable development since the Kokkinakis 
case. The older case law stressed that not every act ‘motivated’ by religion or belief was 
necessarily a manifestation of that religion or belief.29 But this has been a source of endless 
difficultly, sometimes leading to consideration of whether a particular practice was or was not 
mandated by the belief in question, an issue which Courts are generally ill-suited to 
determine. The Court has now adopted a very different approach, and in S.A.S v France the 
Court helpfully made it clear that it is not necessary for an applicant to demonstrate that their 
actions are mandated by their beliefs: the Court took the view that it was sufficient that 
wearing a full face veil was ‘for certain Muslim women, a form of practical observance of 
their religion and can be seen as a “practice”’.30  
This approach builds Eweida and others v UK, which has set out a fundamentally different 
approach to determining whether something is to be considered a ‘manifestation’ from that 
found in earlier cases. In Eweida, the Court drew a distinction between those forms of 
                                                          
25 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, ECHR 2000-XI, para 78 (emphasis added). 
26 Leela Förderkreis e.V. and Others v. Germany, no. 58911/00, 6 November 2008, para 99. Positive obligations 
are discussed further in section (iv) below. 
27 Ibid, para 98, where the Court says that: ‘the German Government, by providing people in good time with 
explanations it considered useful at that time, was aiming to settle a burning public issue and attempting to 
warn citizens against phenomena it viewed as disturbing…. The public authorities wished to enable people, if 
necessary, to take care of themselves and not to land themselves or others in difficulties solely on account of 
lack of knowledge.’ 
28 See, for example, Ivanova v. Bulgaria, no. 52435/99, 12 April 2007, para 79:  ‘a State cannot dictate what a 
person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs’.  
29 This being derived from Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, no. 7050/75, Commission Report, 12 October 
1978, DR 19. 
30 S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, July 2014, para 56. 
manifestation – such as worship or devotion – ‘which form part of the practice of religion or 
belief in a generally recognised form’ and other forms of manifestation where, on the facts of 
the case, there exists ‘a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying 
belief’. 31 Whether this is much of an advance is open to doubt. It certainly is confusing to say 
that one form of manifestation identified by the Convention – ‘worship’ – is in fact an 
example of another – ‘practice’. But the gist of the distinction is that there are some things 
which will always be manifestations, because they reflect an established religious practice, 
whilst there are other acts, which do not reflect such established practices, which may 
nevertheless be considered to be a manifestation on the facts of the case. What this seems to 
amount to saying is that if an act is not usually considered to be a manifestation of religion or 
belief, then it may still be treated as such if it is appropriate to do so. This is not an 
insubstantial or unhelpful change in approach.32 What is clear is that this approach is has little 
to do with the Kokkinakis statement, and the jurisprudential thinking on which it was based.  
(iv) Positive and negative obligations and the conundrum of neutrality 
The previous sections have highlighted some key developments relating to the basic building 
blocks of Article 9 and shown that the focus on the ‘Kokkinakis’ mantra means that the Court 
fails to draw attention to how its approach has changed over time. This is further supported 
by highlighting two further ways in which the Court has changed its approach, but which tend 
to be marginalised by the constant referral back to Kokkinakis.  
The first concerns the idea of positive and negative obligations. This was first developed by 
the Court in the context of Article 8, and has now spread out to other areas of the 
Convention.33 It is fast becoming a commonplace to explore Article 9 on the basis of positive 
and negative obligations. This is almost entirely disingenuous. Article 9 was ‘late to the 
party’, and it is only comparatively recently that this distinction has started being used in this 
context.34 Moreover, the challenge which this poses for the traditional approach to Article 9 
cannot be underestimated, since in many ways it turns it on its head.  
The starting point for an approach based on positive obligations is not so much the right of 
the individual vis a vis the state, but the obligation on the state to secure the right of the 
individual from infringement by non-state actor, infringements for which the State would not 
otherwise be responsible.35 In other words, it requires the state to take action to protect the 
                                                          
31 Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, ECHR 2013, 
para 82. 
32 The difficulty will be knowing how to determine the basis on which such a determination will be made. It 
also opens up the possibility that some forms of manifestation – those associated with an established religious 
practice of a well-established religious tradition – may in reality receive a higher degree of protection than 
others. There appears to be a presumption that some forms of manifestation are to be protected, whereas in 
other cases a sufficiently close nexus needs to be demonstrated. This could prove problematic from a non-
discrimination perspective.  
33 Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31. For a general account see A Mowbrey, The Development of 
Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing, 2004). 
34 Most of the earlier works on Article 9 do not identify this distinction in the work of the Court (let alone the 
Commission) at all. 
35 This is acknowledged in Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 
36516/10, ECHR 2013, para 84, where the Court accepted that since the acts in question had been carried out 
right in question from breaches by others.  A classic example is the Gldani Congregation 
case,36 where the state was required to take action to prevent attacks on worshippers by 
followers of another religious figure.  
It is revealing that some leading works37 now trace the origins of positive obligations in the 
context of Article 9 to cases such as Otto-Preminger-Institute v Austria.38 This, in fact, was a 
case concerning Article 10, the freedom of expression. The issue concerned the decision of 
the Austrian authorities to prohibit the screening of a film considered offensive to religious 
believers. It was, then, a case in which the protection of the sensibilities of religious believers 
was being used as a justification for restricting the freedom of expression under Article 10. 
Whilst this has a lot to do with the idea that the exercise of the freedom of expression should 
be ‘respectful’, it has nothing to do positive obligations under Article 9. What it does have, 
however, is a powerful resonance with the idea which emerged in a series of cases in the 
years following Kokkinakis, that the role of the state was not to take sides in matters 
concerning religion or belief, but that it should ensure there was a ‘level playing field’, 
initially in the field of proselytism.39 This idea – that it was not the role of the state to ‘take 
sides’ in disputes between or within religious communities - quickly developed into another 
judicial accretion to the corpus of doctrine surrounding Article 9, the idea of neutrality. 
Neutrality is not mentioned in Kokkinakis, or in the cases which came before it.40  
No matter how laudable in principle, neutrality is nigh on impossible in practice. And if a 
state has a positive obligation to ensure that everyone can enjoy their freedom of religion or 
belief, it is difficult to see how that can be done without it having to make some assessments 
from time to time of what it is prepared to do in support of, or in opposition to, the practice of 
some groups of believers. This has been obvious even as far back as the Otto-Preminger-
Institut case: it was only because the Austrian authorities chose to intervene by prohibiting 
the screening of the film that an issue arose under Article 10. It is just about inconceivable 
that had it not done so, Catholic believers in the region could have mounted a successful 
claim that their positive freedom of religion had been violated by the failure to do so. Simply 
saying that the state is to be the ‘independent and neutral organiser’ of religion or belief, or 
that it is to act ‘neutrally and impartially’, does not assist determining when it may be 
required to intervene in some way. And it goes without saying that such intervention is 
unlikely to be thought either impartial or neutral by those against whom it is directed. 
The Court seems to have understood this when it said in the Eweida case that ‘Whilst the 
boundary between the State’s positive and negative obligations under the Convention does 
not lend itself to precise definition, the applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both 
                                                          
by private companies and so were no attributable to the state, it could only consider the matter on the basis of 
positive obligations. 
36 Members of the Gldani Congregation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156/01, 3 May 
2007.   
37 Jacobs, Ovey and White, p 433. 
38 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A 
39 Larissis and Others v. Greece, 24 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I. See also B 
Scharffs in this special edition. 
40 The origins of neutrality lie in the cases submitted to the Court concerning the registration of religious 
communities in the years following the accession of former Soviet states to the Council of Europe system. It 
has since become a standard fixture in almost all cases concerning Article 9, although it has been articulated in 
many different ways.  
contexts regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event 
to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State…’.41 In truth, it might as well have said 
that the entire distinction is little more than a heuristic device of dubious legitimacy and 
marginal utility.  
If this were are far as it went, that might be bad enough. But there is more. The juxtaposition 
of an obligation of neutrality and a positive obligation to prevent breaches by non-state actors 
when it may be appropriate for the state to do so has at times morphed into a positive 
obligation to be ‘neutral and impartial’. Acting in a neutral and impartial way is one thing: 
being neutral and impartial is quite another. It is true that the Court - has never said in 
categorical terms that the obligation of neutrality under Article 9 means that it is incompatible 
with the Convention for there to be a state church: indeed, it has accepted the legitimacy of 
state churches,42 provided that this does not have negative consequences for those of other 
religions or beliefs. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how this is really reconcilable with 
much of what the Court has said concerning neutrality and impartiality.  
Be that as it may, the language of neutrality has given rise to an even more contentious idea, 
that not only is the state itself is to be ‘neutral’ in its dealing with religions or beliefs, but that 
the State it is itself to be ‘neutral’ in how it engages with its citizens. It is on this basis that 
contentious decisions have been taken concerning the wearing of religious clothing or 
symbols by public employees43 or in state-run facilities.44 It is on this basis that it has been 
claimed that religious symbols must not be present in public buildings.45 This is not the place 
to discuss the merits of these positions – but it is important to note that somehow, in 25 years 
of jurisprudence built upon the recognition of the vital importance of religious pluralism to 
democratic life, we have arrived at a position in which banning religious believers from 
merely wearing their religiously inspired clothing in public appears capable of being 
necessary in a democratic society.46 
This is bolstered by the recognition of another right, not otherwise known from the text of 
convention, having come to be discerned. This is the ‘negative’ freedom. At one level, this is 
merely the inevitable consequence of having discovered the ‘positive’ obligation. 
Nevertheless, there has been some significant jurisprudential slippage. Returning to basics, it 
is possible to argue that even being forced to participate in ceremonies or religious practices 
of religions or belief systems other than ones’ own does not necessarily mean one is not free 
to believe as one wishes.47 However, and as has been seen in connection with the discussion 
                                                          
41 Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, ECHR 2013, 
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42 See, for example, Ásatrúarfélagið v. Iceland (dec.), no. 22897/08, 18 September 2012. 
43 E.g Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V and, recently, Ebrahimian v. France, 26 
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2014. 
47 Indeed, some old cases endorsed this position, at least as regard ceremonials. E.g., in Valsamis v. Greece, 18 
December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI  the court upheld the right of a school to insist on 
concerning the distinction between the forum internum and forum externum, it is increasing 
recognised that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion offers protection from being 
forced to act in ways which are contrary to ones beliefs, provided this does not adversely 
affect the rights of others.  
This claim is closely related to that of conscientious objection on grounds of religion or 
belief, the precise contours of which are contentious and beyond this scope of this comment. 
But not being required to participate in an activity is not the same thing as being exposed to 
an activity – yet when combined with the obligation of neutrality and impartiality, it has 
become possible to argue that a person ought to be free in the public realm from exposure to 
the trappings of religion (and, presumably, of belief). The apotheosis of this argument being 
in the case of Lautsi v. Italy, where the Chamber judgment argued that, in a state school, 
‘Negative freedom of religion is not restricted to the absence of religious services or religious 
education. It extends to practices and symbols expressing, in particular or in general, a belief, 
a religion or atheism’.48 The Grand Chamber, happily (if controversially), stepped back from 
this position in a judgment49 which is notable for its lack of visibility in the reasoning in 
subsequent judgments by the Court on analogous issues. The problem is that it is just not 
possible to be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in a neutral fashion. The Court has never really 
engaged with this problem. But why do so – when it can ‘quote Kokkinakis’ and justify 
almost any and every outcome?  
(v) the nature of the right to religion or belief 
A final point concerns the Court’s understanding of the very nature of religious belief, and 
can be shortly made. In Eweida v. UK it was said that ‘Religious freedom is primarily a 
matter of individual thought and conscience. This aspect of the right….. is absolute and 
unqualified. However… freedom of religion also encompasses the freedom to manifest one’s 
belief … in community with others … Since the manifestation by one person of his or her 
religious belief may have an impact on others, the drafters of the Convention qualified this 
aspect of freedom of religion in the manner set out in Article 9(2).’50 
Six months later, in Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania51 the Grand Chamber said that 
‘The autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a 
democratic society and is an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. 
It directly concerns not only the organisation of these communities as such but also the 
effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all their active members. Were the 
organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9, all other aspects of the 
individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable’.52 
                                                          
the participation of a child in a national day parade which the child considered to be militaristic and thus not in 
accordance with his religiously based pacifist beliefs.  
48 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, 3 November 2009, para 55. 
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30985/96, ECHR 2000-XI, para 62. 
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this: the origins of the connection between the autonomous existence and religious communities and 
Whereas Eweida emphasises the individual nature of the right, the Sindicatul case highlights 
its collective nature. Both draw on the Kokkinakis statement; Eweida quoting it expressly,53 
Sindicatul by using its language, although not directly acknowledging it. This tension lies at 
the heart of much of the controversy surrounding the practical application of Article 9: is it 
focussed on the individual, the religious or belief communities or the broader community as a 
whole? Is it about the individual versus the community? Or is it about the individual in 
community? And which community? Both cases raised precisely such questions. The 
problem with the Kokkinakis approach is that it can support outcomes based on any of these 
approaches – or none. But this is not a new difficulty: both of these statements are also to be 
found in the seminal case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria.54 The tension is longstanding 
and unresolved – and perhaps unresolvable: who (or what), precisely, is the freedom of 
religion or belief for? At the moment, it appears to be a ‘precious asset’ for everyone in 
general – but the thing it seems to protect in particular is the discretion of the state to do as it 
thinks fit. Which is a very strange thing for a human right to do. 
Conclusion 
In the 25 years since the Kokkinakis case the jurisprudence concerning Article 9 has 
developed prodigiously. This is only to be expected. During that time, some of the 
fundamental assumptions upon which the basic organisational architecture and fundamental 
underpinning concepts have also changed. Yet from the manner in which the Court routinely 
approaches Article 9 – and underscored by its continual recall of its Kokkinakis mantra - one 
would be unware of just how significant those changes have been. Once again, the impression 
of serene continuity is conveyed, whilst a jurisprudential maelstrom has been taking place 
beneath the surface. This comment has only focussed on very small number of issues, and 
superficially at that. Moreover, the most contentious – the margin of appreciation has not 
been considered at all.55 Other pieces in this collection explore both these themes and many 
others in greater depth. But it is hoped that enough has been said to sustain the case that the 
time has come – after 25 years – for the Court to identify a new foundational basis for its 
approach to Article 9, which better reflects the manner in which its jurisprudence has evolved 
over the years. Of course, that might just be part of the reason why the Court continues to 
quote Kokkinakis: who can seriously object to what is said in the ‘Kokkinakis’ statement – 
and who is seriously comfortable with the Court’s current jurisprudence on Article 9? 
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